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BOOK REVIEW OF

ALAN BOYLE AND CHRISTINE CHINKIN ,
THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS , 2007)

by Sean D. Murphy
George Washington University Law School
(the final version of this book review appears in the October 2010 issue of the American
Journal of international Law)

One of the abiding mysteries about the teaching of public international law is the peculiar
disconnect between the extensive focus on four classic “sources” of international law, as typically
taught in law schools or recounted in treatises, and the way in which contemporary international law
is actually made. The prime example of that disconnect is probably customary international law.
While most textbooks and treatises spend considerable time explicating the requirements for
uniform, consistent, and long-standing State practice, combined with opinio juris, as illustrated
through key decisions of the World Court from years past (such as the S.S. Lotus case or North Sea
Continental Shelf cases), and perhaps with some attention to the great controversies about the source
(such as whether “words” can suffice instead of “action”), it is actually rather difficult to identify a
new norm of international law that has emerged purely as a matter of widespread State practice.
Indeed, although theory would call for a detailed search of the practice and beliefs of States spanning
decades, if not centuries, rarely do international or national courts today engage in any such inquiry,
and rarer still do States as a predicate to their diplomatic exchanges.
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Conversely, an extraordinary range of international “rules” or “norms” are created today
through mechanisms that do not fit easily into the traditional sources of international law. Nonbinding “recommendations” of the World Health Organization, developed by respected experts in
the field, have a treaty-like effect in prompting national health administrations to adopt laws and
regulations that implement the recommendations. Resolutions of the UN Security Council impose
“legislative-like” obligations upon States in an effort to prevent the financing of terrorist
organizations or to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction. Trade obligations arising
under the Uruguay Round agreements may be avoided if national laws seek to uphold “standards”
established by entities such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission or the Commission on
Phytosanitary Measures. Committees or commissions formed under multilateral human rights
treaties assert a power to interpret and at times expand the meaning of such conventions, as well as
to judge the permissibility of reservations made by State parties. Transnational corporations, eager
to avoid adverse publicity, boycotts, and even litigation, adopt and implement non-binding “codes
of conduct” (generated by States, international organizations, or non-governmental organizations),
which in some instances non-governmental organizations provide mechanisms for independent
certification of compliance. One or a few non-binding resolutions universally agreed to by States that
purport to recognize a legal norm are used as evidence of customary international law.

The nature of such “norms” as “law” is, of course, debated, and some adhere to a notion that
ultimately many of these norms can be traced back to some form of consent by a State to a treaty
obligation. Yet, in light of such developments, the standard account of the four “sources” of
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international law seems woefully incomplete, and must give way to a much richer explanation of
how international legal norms can and do emerge.

Thankfully, many notable efforts have been undertaken over the past decade to study such
law-making, such as Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein’s path-breaking article in the pages of this
Journal on law-making by autonomous institutional arrangements in multilateral agreements,1
Dinah Shelton’s edited collection analyzing the effects of non-binding international norms,2 AnneMarie Slaughter’s account of law-making by networks of governmental experts operating across
borders,3 Anthony Anghie’s exploration of the enduring influence of colonial and Euro-centric
attitudes in shaping international law,4 José Alvarez’s thorough treatise on law-making by
international organizations,5 or the on-going research project at New York University School of Law
on “global administrative law”,6 to name just a few.

In The Making of International Law, Professors Alan Boyle of the University of Edinburgh
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and Christine Chinkin of the London School of Economics add to this literature, but set their sights
on providing a broad account of contemporary law-making, looking across different areas of
organizational behavior, both governmental and non-governmental. They eschew a doctrinal
discussion of the four classic sources of international law, providing instead “a study of the principal
multilateral processes and law-making tools through which contemporary international law is made”
(p. vii). To that end, Chapter 1 addresses certain general aspects of international law-making,
including a survey of theories of international law, problems of legitimacy in new law-making
techniques, and calls for general reform. Chapter 2 addresses the “who” of international law-making
(i.e., the participants), Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the “how” of such law-making (i.e., multilateral lawmaking through diplomatic processes or codificiation/development through expert bodies), and
Chapter 5 recounts “what” is produced by such law-making (i.e., the types of law-making
instruments). Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the role of international courts and tribunals as lawmakers, making the case that international judges do not only apply law as they find it, but fill in
gaps and in some instances extend or create new norms.

Two particular short-comings of this volume should first be noted before moving onto its
attractive elements. First, although the title might suggest otherwise, the book does not provide a
systematic account of the “making” of international law. There is no discussion of the making of
international law through bilateral treaties or other instruments, little discussion of the making of
international law by multilateral treaties in the sense of creating binding obligations directly upon
the parties to the treaty, and virtually no discussion of law-making in the form of classic customary
international law. At the beginning of the volume, the authors suggest that such traditional sources
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of international law have been recounted elsewhere and hence need not be addressed again (p. 2),
but as one moves through the volume it becomes clearer that the authors conception of the “making”
of international law entails law that is “made” through mechanisms other than the classic sources
of international law. Thus, the authors assert that “[w]e can only begin to talk seriously about
international law-making processes, ... if we identify some other sense in which the instruments
[States] adopt become ‘law’ beyond the specific context of participation in a treaty or the affirmation
of a soft law instrument” (p. 161). In other words, when States conclude a multilateral treaty that
directly binds them, they have not engaged in a process that “makes” law or at least not law that
needs to be seriously discussed.

Yet such an account of the “making” of international law is just as incomplete and unhelpful
as an account that sees international law-making as arising solely from the classic sources of
international law. Both classic and more contemporary forms of international law-making exist and
deserve serious study. A volume focusing solely on more contemporary forms of international lawmaking is certainly appropriate, but it need not characterize traditional means as something other
than “law-making”. At a minimum, the authors might have explained and defended their concept of
“law-making”, so as to clarify their choice of processes and to avoid confusion for those not already
versed in the traditional sources of international law.

Second, even with respect to more contemporary forms of law-making, the book does not
seek “to provide a comprehensive account of the myriad ways in which contemporary international
law is made” (p. 2). One cannot fault the authors for avoiding the difficulty of trying to provide a
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definitive account, in a single volume, of the whole range of contemporary forms of law-making, and
instead reaching for selected “examples” and “case studies” so as “to provide a flavour of the
diversity of international law-making processes” (p. 2). Yet even within this more scaled-back,
sampler approach, several parts of the volume seem oddly skewed in their content.

For example, Chapter 2 of the book is on “Participants in International Law-Making”. The
chapter begins by noting that a “focus solely on state actions gives a misleading picture of
international law-making” (p. 41). After that sensible observation, virtually the entire rest of the
chapter—about one fifth of the book—is about non-governmental organizations, covering topics
such as “NGOs and the UN”, “NGOs and Treaty-Making”, “NGOs and International Law-Making,”
NGOs Monitoring and Norm Generation,” and so on. Among other things, the authors note that the
number of NGOs represented at the Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court “was
larger than the number of participating states (160) and larger than any single state delegation” (p.
73). Given this extensive emphasis on NGOs in a chapter addressing “participants”, one might
naturally emerge a belief that the most important “participant” in contemporary international lawmaking are NGOs, yet that belief would be just as misleading as one that regards States alone as the
relevant actor. States continue to play a dominant role in the formation of contemporary international
law, as do international organizations, with NGO’s as an important but secondary participant.
Another example of a distorted focus might be the lack of sufficient attention to national law as a
means for international law-making (a brief discussion appears at pp. 85-87). National law plays an
extraordinary role in international law-making, both in terms of reducing inchoate international
norms to detailed and binding national laws and regulations, and in terms of generating new
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international norms and principles through national legislation or case law that emerges across the
globe.

Despite its flaws, the book is well worth reading. Boyle and Chinkin are extraordinarily
gifted international lawyers, highly conversant in the mechanisms by which international law
operates, especially in fields where their expertise is sharpest, such as the law of the sea and human
rights. In a very well-written, coherently organized, and relatively brief text (300 pages), they cover
a wide array of important issues, including how the international law-making agenda gets set, the
importance of “legitimacy” for law-making processes, the vexing role of “soft law” in conditioning
inter-State behavior, and the role of international courts in not just stating the law, but creating it as
well. Perhaps curiously, given their emphasis on contemporary law-making, Boyle and Chinkin
spend a considerable amount of time discussing two “old school” entities, the International Law
Commission (ILC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but both discussions are informative
and rich in insights. Further, throughout the volume, the authors provide copious citations to
contemporary cases and scholarship, along with a helpful list of further readings at the end of each
chapter.

One of the strengths of the volume is that the authors are careful to avoid facile opinions. For
example, though they clearly recognize the significance of NGO participation in international lawmaking, they cautiously conclude that “it seems premature to assert that there is a right to access and
participation” for NGOs in that law-making (p. 57). Moreover, they worry about the disconnect
between contemporary law-making and the traditional reliance on State-based consent, noting that
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“[p]articularly in areas such as human rights or environmental law there is a tendency to assert new
norms of customary law at will in order to advance political and social agendas—an activity pursued
especially by NGOs.” When that happens, “[s]cant regard is given to the niceties of state consent or
the likelihood of compliance with such easily pronounced norms” (p. 285). Another strength of the
book are Boyle and Chinkin’s identification of strengths and weaknesses in contemporary
international law-making, and their suggestions for improvement. For example, while some have
decried the relatively small number of international lawyers who repeatedly appear before the ICJ
and other global tribunals, Boyle and Chinkin applaud this development, since this “epistemic
community of the comparatively small body of lawyers ... ensures a common set of perspectives
about the appropriate way to present an international case and has a tangible impact upon the way
international courts function, and thus on their law-making potential” (p. 291). Looking to the future,
they suggest that the ILC could play a larger role in international law-making processes by actively
proposing cooperation with UN organs and international organizations so as to find useful proposals
for future ILC work, rather than relying just on ILC-initiated ideas (p. 177).

Both authors are U.K. nationals and they occasionally express views about the role of the
United States in the making of international law. Particularly for the many U.S. nationals who are
readers of this Journal, the following proposition will be of interest: “The perception that the US can
and should operate more effectively outside many of the constraints of international law poses the
greatest contemporary challenge to the post-1945 system of multilateral law-making exercised
principally through the United Nations” (p. 104). Presumably the entity doing the “perceiving” is the
U.S. Government, or perhaps the people of the United States, and it is interesting that the authors
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are not asserting that the challenge arises from an actual ability of the United States to operate
outside the constraints of international law but, rather, the United States’ perception that such an
ability exists. More discussion as to why this factor is the “greatest” contemporary challenge was
probably warranted, given the existence of other contenders, such as the inability or unwillingness
of many States actually to implement the treaties that they ratify, the enduring difficulty for
international courts and tribunals in securing wide-ranging jurisdiction to which States adhere (the
difficulty of the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in developing a significant caseload or the paucity
of prosecutions at the International Criminal Court come to mind), or the intractable economic
disparities between blocs of States that often polarize and politicize the law-making processes.
Indeed, as the authors themselves note, sometimes it is the “unilateral” action by the United States
that results in international law-making, such as the adoption of IMO regulations phasing out single
hull oil tankers (p. 133) or the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round (p. 136).

All-in-all, for those interested in an engaging and informed survey of various ways in which
international law is currently made, this book makes an excellent starting point, and points the
direction for those who wish to embark on even deeper inquiries.

SEAN D. MURPHY
George Washington University Law School

